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I. Introduction
In early April 2011, a wave of migrants left behind political and social unrest
in North Africa for safety and stability in Italy.' Faced with hundreds of refu-
gees, the Italian government chose to issue residence permits to facilitate their
movement within the rest of Europe. 2 This move, however, was not exactly wel-
comed by other member states whose borders now became open to these mi-
grants. 3 As a result and in response to these permits, France closed part of its
border with Italy, establishing border control checks and halting a train carrying
t J.D. Expected May 2013, Loyola University Chicago.
I Ian Traynor & John Hooper, France and Italy in call to close EU borders in wake ofArab protests,
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/26/eu-borders-arab-protests.
2 See id. (discussing the decision by Italy to issue residential permits).
3 See id. (explaining the uneasiness bordering countries to Italy, particularly France, had when they
decided to issue these permits to these migrants).
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immigrants from Ventimiglia, Italy.4 One effect of this border closure was that it
caused many to question the Schengen Agreement, one of the European Union's
foundational agreements allowing the free movement of peoples within the signa-
tory member states.5
Initially signed into treaty on June 14, 1985, the Schengen Agreement
("Schengen" or "the Agreement") consolidated twenty-five European countries
into one borderless zone in order to facilitate the free movement of labor and to
provide for the new Eurozone economy.6 By permitting in its Border Codes a
temporary closure by a member state, the European Union through Schengen
allows a country to re-erect borders if there are "exceptional circumstances." 7
However, in the past five years, temporary internal border controls throughout all
of Europe have been re-erected a mere twenty-six times.8
The actions by France in April 2011 caused an upheaval in the established
order under Schengen and created a rift within the EU.9 Those governments who
have expressed support for France's border closure typically favor more sover-
eignty for member states and increased border control, both externally and inter-
nally.i 0 Critics of France's actions, such as the EU Commission, responded by
proposing that each member state have less power to re-erect the borders." The
Commission argued that legislation was needed that would require national gov-
4 Id.; Sergio Carrera et al., A Race against Solidarity The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian
Affair, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN PoLIcY Swuous 1, 1-2 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.epim.info/
wp-content/uploads/201 1/01/The-Franco- Italian-Affair.pdf.
5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 77, Sep. 5,
2008, 2008 OJ. (C 115/47) [hereinafter TFEU]; see France seeks change to Schengen border agreement,
BBC NEws, Apr. 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13171403 (explaining the changes
sought by France for the Schengen Agreement stemmed from their desire to have more control over their
borders and to avoid situations where one state bears a larger burden of immigrants and migrants than
other states simply because they remain a border state); see also Free movement of persons, asylum and
immigration, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/justice freedom security/free movement_
ofpersons..asylum-immigrationlindex -en.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (describing the purposes of the
Schengen Agreement and explaining the existing aspects of the agreement and its effects on people in the
area of immigration and asylum).
6 See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 77 (explaining what the goals of Schengen would be for the European
Union, what changes would be involved and the purpose of doing so); see, e.g., EURoPA, supra note 5
(explaining the purposes of the Agreement in creating a borderless area to benefit the member states
economically by removing barriers that existed previously and prevent free movement and travel
amongst the states).
7 See EUROPA, supra note 5 (giving the details for when an internal border control can be imple-
mented). Defining an internal border as: "common land borders, including river and lake borders, of EU
countries, airports for internal flights, and sea, river and lake ports for regular ferry connections." Id.
8 Id.; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 23 (discussing the limited circumstances under which member
states have resurrected internal border controls).
9 Traynor & Hooper, supra note 1; BnC NEWS, supra note 5; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 9 (discuss-
ing the disruption caused after France made the decision to close off its borders temporarily and stop a
train carrying migrants and NGO workers due to the threat of a demonstration in support of those
migrants).
10 Traynor & Hooper, supra note 1; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining that the Commission
did not support the idea that the migrants from North Africa constituted a threat to national security).
I1 See Traynor & Hooper, supra note I (finding, rather than Italy or France urged to do, that the
North African migrants were not considered an "emergency", and this decisions was supported by the
large majority of EU countries).
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ernments to seek approval from the Commission before it curbed freedom of
movement. 12 Following this proposal, the European Council met in June 2011
and reiterated the importance of common policy and the need for a single Euro-
pean border.' 3
This comment argues first that France's actions were not legal under the Bor-
der Codes. Furthermore, it illustrates how France's actions have called into ques-
tion the fundamental effectiveness of the Schengen Agreement and the
cohesiveness of its member states.14 Part II of this Comment traces the creation
of the Schengen Agreement and briefly outlines a member state's ability to tem-
porarily re-introduce internal border controls under limited circumstances.' 5
Next, Part III outlines past border control decisions by France as well as relevant
ECJ cases, in order to shed light on France's most recent actions.16 This Part
then explains the opposition to France's actions by the European Council and
European Commission and the needed changes for the Schengen Agreement.' 7
Part IV explains that the border checks and closure were not permissible under
the Border Codes, and France's decision to implement them stemmed from long-
standing issues with illegal immigration.' 8 This Part further argues that, rather
than presenting a national security threat, the group of migrants presented a threat
only to France's policies and attempts to control its own borders.' 9 Part V rec-
ommends that the EU act according to its own policy of solidarity by creating a
more common policy for internal and external border control, either by altering
some of the Border Codes or creating a new EU-controlled system for border
controls that applies when a threat to national security exists. 2 0 Finally, Part VI
concludes that the member states need to adopt more cohesive and uniform im-
12 See id. (acknowledging the need for improvements and changes to the current Schengen system in
order to create a more uniform process, and to avoid divides amongst countries that have different views
about what an "emergency" situation really means).
13 See nC News, supra note 5 (explaining that the actions by France demonstrated their desire for a
more succinct policy on border controls).
14 See infra Part IV (arguing that France's border checks and blockade of the train coming from Italy
were not legal under the Border Codes and highlights the existing issues regarding the effectiveness of
the Schengen Agreement).
15 See infra Part II (explaining the TFEU, the development of the Schengen Agreement, the Border
Codes and Article 23, allowing the temporary re-introduction of internal border controls by a member
state).
16 See infra Part Ill.B-C (discussing the previous border checks instituted by France were found as
impermissible by the ECJ and explaining the most recent border checks and closures to prevent North
African migrants from entering the border).
'7 See infra Part Ill.A (explaining the position of the Commission and the Council, highlighting the
proposals made by the Council to deal with limiting a countries' ability to institute border checks simply
because it does not want a certain group of migrants to enter its territory).
18 See infra Part IV.A-B (arguing that the small number of migrants on the train, as well as the
estimated number of demonstrators did not constitute a threat to security and the justifications by France
came from its desire to limit immigration).
19 See infra Part IV.B (arguing that France's past and present issues with immigration largely influ-
enced its decisions to implement the border checks and to stop the train coming from Italy, rather than
actually believing the threat of demonstration could constitute a national security threat).
20 See infra Part V (recommending that rather than being seen as a problem, immigration issues
should be dealt with by establishing more cohesive policies for EU member states that are part of the
Volume 9, Issue 2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 329
Suspending Schengen
migration policies in order for the Schengen Agreement to continue to be an
effective and important policy in the EU. 2 1
II. Background
A. Treaty on the Function of the European Union ("TFEU"): Creation of the
Schengen Agreement
Established in 1997 as part of European Union law, the Schengen Agreement
effectively removed individual member states' rights to enforce national borders
and instead created a borderless area consisting of over 400 million people in
twenty-five countries. 2 2 Under Schengen, the EU was to further develop a com-
mon policy that would disable any controls over internal borders of the signatory
parties, while also overseeing an integrated system for managing the area's exter-
nal borders. 2 3 Before Schengen was incorporated into EU law, the right to move
among and reside freely within the various member states was not one many
states encouraged, and administrative formalities existed preventing easy travel
by citizens, visitors, and immigrants alike.2 4 For this reason, it is helpful to un-
derstand the purpose of the Schengen Agreement for the European Union and the
Schengen Agreement, either by altering the terms of Article 23 under the Codes, or by creating an EU-
based system to deal with situations where the national security of a state might actually be threatened).
21 See infra Part VI (concluding that the Schengen Agreement and the Border Codes, in their current
form, are not able to operate as effectively as they could if the member states had common policies and
more specified guidelines under the Border Codes).
22 See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 77 (outlining the Schengen agreement and its policies and procedures
under European Union law).
23 Id. The TFEU lists the following duties for the EU to adopt and follow as part of creation of the
Schengen Agreement:
1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to: (a) ensuring the absence of any controls on
persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders (b) carrying out checks on
persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders (c) gradual introduction of an
integrated management system for external borders.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accor-
dance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures concerning: (a) the common
policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits; (b) the checks to which persons crossing
external borders are subject; (c) the conditions under which nationals of third countries shall
have the freedom to travel within the Union for a short period; (d) any measure necessary for the
gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders; (e) the absence
of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders.
Visas are issued to non-EU citizens for a number of reasons, but most commonly, re-unification
of family, employment and education.
3. If action by the Union should prove necessary to facilitate the exercise of the right referred to
in Article 20(2)(a), and if the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council,
acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt provisions concerning pass-
ports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such document. The Council shall act unani-
mously after consulting the European Parliament.
4. This Article shall not affect the competence of the Member States concerning the geographi-
cal demarcation of their borders, in accordance with international law.
Id.
24 See EUROPA, supra note 5 (explaining the rights of citizens that exist for themselves and their
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states and the encourage-
ment of this movement across the member states).
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exception under Article 23 of the Border Codes allowing the re-introduction of
internal border controls. 2 5
The overall purpose of Schengen was to enable the free movement of goods
and labor.2 6 By doing so, the Agreement was also meant to increase the likeli-
hood of long-term success of the new union.27 Initially agreed upon by five of
the ten original member states,28 the Agreement now automatically incorporates
itself into each new member country's laws and safeguards the free movement of
people, essentially allowing the EU to operate as a single state for travel pur-
poses, similar to the United States. 2 9
As part of the TFEU requirements,30 the EU created an agency known as
FRONTEX to administer border controls. 31 As a specialized and indepen-
dent body within the EU, FRONTEX coordinates cooperation among the mem-
ber states in the field of border security. 32 Ultimately, its purpose is to
complement and provide particular added value to the national border manage-
ment systems of the member states.33 Through cooperation with FRONTEX,
member states have amended their national border policies to allow free move-
ment and travel, while at the same time organizing operations in favor of border
control due to FRONTEX's expanding presence. 34
B. Ability to Temporarily Re-erect Internal Borders by an Individual Country
In March 2006, several years after Schengen itself was codified, the Schengen
Border Codes were adopted to improve border-related policy management and
25 See infra Part II.B (outlining the exceptions under Article 23 under the Schengen Border Codes).
26 See id. (outlining the Schengen Agreement, and the requirements of each member state in elimi-
nating internal borders and applying the common rules and procedures outlined therein); see also Eu-
ROPA, supra note 5 (explaining that the goals of the Agreement, by eliminating internal borders and
finding the free movement of people as a fundamental right and one that would enable the EU to
flourish).
27 EUROPA, supra note 5. Signatory parties to the Schengen Agreement include the original five
countries France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, with Italy joining on November
27, 1990, Spain and Portugal joining on June 25, 1991, followed by Greece on November 6, 1992 and
Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden in 1995 and 1996. Id. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined on 21 December 2007, followed by
Switzerland in 2008. Id. The last two countries, United Kingdom and Ireland, can take part in some
aspects of the Schengen agreement if the Schengen Member States and the government representative of
the country in question vote unanimously in favor within the Council. Id.
28 See id. (citing the original signatory parties included France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and
the Netherlands).
29 See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 77 (explaining that by eliminating internal borders, one single exter-
nal border would exist, facilitating its goals of freedom, justice and security).
30 TFEU, supra note 5, art.77.
31 See What is Frontex?, FRONTEx: EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012) (explaining the work of the agency for the EU is to "coordinate the operational
cooperation between Member States in the field of border security").
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Martin Schain, The Border: The Immigration Dilemma and the State in France, Biennial
Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 17 (Mar. 3-5, 2011) (describing the state of
France and the effectiveness of the efforts to control immigration).
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still remain an important part of a unified approach to internal and external bor-
der supervision within the Union.35 As part of these Codes, and despite
Schengen's policy of eradicating internal border controls, a temporary rein-
troduction of border control at internal borders by a state is permissible under
limited circumstances. 36 Under the Border Codes, when "a serious threat to se-
curity or public policy" arises, a country can set up border controls for a limited
period of thirty days. 37 Whenever a country decides that such actions are neces-
sary, it is also required to notify the European Commission and European Parlia-
ment of this action. 38
However, over the past five years, the re-erection of border controls by mem-
ber states has highlighted some of the flaws in the Schengen Agreement. 39 Now,
ten years after its implementation, many countries - including France, Germany,
Italy, and Denmark - have called into question the effectiveness of Schengen.40
It is mostly true that border controls are invoked temporarily by states only when
they are hosting major events, such as major international sporting events like the
World Cup 4 1 or European football championships. 42 Invariably, these situations
deal with a huge, one-time entry of foreigners into an individual country. 43 How-
ever, there is no requirement in the Codes that a country be hosting a major event
35 See Regulation No. 562/2006 of the Eur. Parl. and of the Council of 15 March 2006, 2006 O.J. (L
105) 1-32. [hereinafter Schengen Border Codes] (modifying the existing legislation on border checks in
the EU and intended to improve the border management aspect of the Schengen Agreement by providing
rules regarding internal and external borders); see also TFEU, supra note 4, art. 77 (outlining the
Schengen Agreement, requirements for member states to adopt and maintain cohesive border policies).
36 See Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, Annex VI § 1.1.2 (explaining the reintroduction of
internal borders is permissible, but only in "exceptional" circumstances" and only for a period of no more
than thirty days).
37 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35. More than thirty days is permissible under the Codes "for
the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds the period of 30 days, in accordance
with the procedure laid down in Article 24 or, in urgent cases, with that laid down in Article 25." Id. 1I.
The duration of the control need not exceed what is necessary to respond to the threat, and if the threat
continues beyond the permissible time then that state may prolong "provided for in paragraph 1, the
Member State may prolong border control on the same grounds as those referred to in paragraph I and,
taking into account any new elements, for renewable periods of up to 30 days, in accordance with the
procedure laid down in Article 26." Id. 2.
38 See id. (explaining the necessary actions, informing both Commission and Parliament, that need to
be taken by a state who decides to re-erect internal borders under these Codes).
39 See Ian Traynor, EU Executive to Stop Countries Bringing Back Border Controls, THE GUARDIAN,
Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /sep/06/eu-executive-countries-border-controls (ex-
plaining the implications for resurrection of border controls, and the rarity of such an occurrence).
40 See Traynor and Hooper, supra note 1.
41 Id. (explaining that the huge influx created by an event, such as the World Cup, could constitute a
reason of national security, permissible under the Border Codes); see also FRONrEX, PRESS PACK (May
2011) 29, available at www.frontex.europa.eu/download/. . /presspack_2011-05_final.pdf (showing the
occasions when a member state has enabled border control, with the help of joint border operations by
Frontex, for reasons of national security during the World Cup). In 2006, Denmark, with the help of
Frontex, implemented border controls for the 2006 World Cup. Id.
42 Id.
43 See id. (describing the events where countries have typically re-introduced border controls, sport-
ing events a large majority due to the number of entrants who will temporarily be in the country for that
event, and the need for security during this time).
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in order to re-introduce border controls." The introduction of border controls in
these types of situations has caused countries to question the Agreement's ability
to control influxes of migration.45 Due to these concerns, several nations issued
requests for a common policy solution to migration problems.46
III. Discussion
Currently, under the Schengen Agreement, the general rule of free movement
has exceptions. 4 7 These exceptions include the ability of a member state to exer-
cise police powers in order to "check" the territory, but these checks may not rise
to the level of a typical border control in most countries.48 The Border Codes
also stipulate that any check conducted along an internal border must take place
"irrespective of nationality." 4 9 Therefore, France's decision to close its border
with Italy and to block a train full of migrants from North Africa would likely be
44 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35 (referencing both Article 21 and 23, allowing the re-intro-
duction of border controls or checks).
45 See Traynor, supra note 39 (discussing the countries, such as Germany, who deal with immigrants
and migrants every day, and who have questioned the complaints of other countries like Italy and France
who claim that influxes of migrants affect national security).
46 See Traynor & Hooper supra note I (explaining that while France and Italy call for change to the
Schengen system and more independent actions in terms of border security and controls for member
states, other countries, such as Germany and Sweden strongly oppose these ideas and have little sympa-
thy for Italy and the increase influx of migrants because both countries much higher numbers of asylum
seekers and less restrictive immigration policies).
47 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 21. Checks within the territory:
The abolition of border control at internal borders shall not affect:
(a) the exercise of police powers by the competent authorities of the Member States under
national law, insofar as the exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to
border checks; that shall also apply in border areas. Within the meaning of the first sentence,
the exercise of police powers may not, in particular, be considered equivalent to the exercise
of border checks when the police measures:
(i) do not have border control as an objective,
(ii) are based on general police information and experience regarding possible threats to
public security and aim, in particular, to combat cross-border crime,
(iii) are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on
persons at the external borders,
(iv) are carried out on the basis of spot-checks;
(b) security checks on persons carried out at ports and airports by the competent authorities
under the law of each Member State, by port or airport officials or carriers, provided that
such checks are also carried out on persons travelling within a Member State;
(c) the possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation to hold or carry
papers and documents;
(d) the obligation on third-country nationals to report their presence on the territory of any
Member State pursuant to the provisions of Article 22 of the Schengen Convention.
Id.
48 See id. (explaining that the objective of the police checks must not have border control as its
objective, otherwise those checks could constitute border checks, instead of just police power "check"
and outside the exceptions under these Codes).
49 See id., art. 20 (outlining the rules for crossing internal borders, indicating that they may be
crossed "at any point without a border check on persons, irrespective of their nationality, being carried
out").
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considered outside this realm of exceptions.50 A certain nationality of migrants
cannot constitute a real "security threat."5 ' Previous ECJ decisions involving the
Schengen Agreement shed light on France's decision to implement border checks
and closures, which directly impacted the viability and effectiveness of the
Agreement. 52  Finally, discussion at the EU Council's meeting addressing
France's actions resulted in its ultimate proposals to alter the Schengen
Agreement. 53
A. The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") and Violations of the Schengen
Border Codes
Under the Schengen Border Codes, a country's use of police powers to
"check" borders is limited under Article 21, particularly in light of recent cases
brought before the European Court of Justice. 5 4  When dealing with cases in
which a country has been accused of violating the Border Codes by instituting
border checks, the ECJ has often found these checks could be considered border
control measures.55
50 Traynor &Hooper, supra note 1; see BBC Nrws, supra note 5 (discussing France's decision to
close its borders and block a train coming from Ventimiglia, Italy, carrying migrants and NGO workers);
see also Carrera, supra note 4, at I (discussing the internal border checks held back hundreds of migrants
who held temporary residential permits coming from Italy).
51 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23 (outlining the temporary re-introduction of internal
border control under Chapter II, Article 23).
52 See infra Part IlIl.A-B (discussing the ECJ decision in Melki and the recent checks implemented by
France); see Carrera, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining the re-introduction of border controls went beyond
what is permissible under the Border Codes and rather represented an instance of anti-immigration mea-
sures by France, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the Schengen system as a whole in allowing "border
free" travel by all who are permitted).
53 See infra Part III.C (discussing the proposals made by the Council and its invited recommenda-
tions by the Commission regarding the Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Border Codes).
54 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 21; Joined Cases, C-188/10 Aziz Melki v. Fr. & C-
189/10 Sdlim Abdeli v. Fr., 2010 E.C.R. 00000 (June 22, 2010) [hereinafter Joined Cases, Melki &
Abdeli]; see European Union, EUROPA.nu, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/in-
dexen.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (explaining the five most common cases brought before the Euro-
pean Union). The following are the most common types of cases:
requests for a preliminary ruling - when national courts ask the Court of Justice to interpret a
point of EU law
actions for failure to fulfil[l] an obligation - brought against EU governments for not applying
EU law
actions for annulment - against EU laws thought to violate the EU treaties or fundamental rights
actions for failure to act - against EU institutions for failing to make decisions required of them
direct actions - brought by individuals, companies or organisations against EU decisions or
actions
Id.
55 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 12 (outlining the ECJ and the Melki case where the police powers
imposed by the French were found to have exceeded their powers and were rather actually disguised as
border checks, something not permissible under the Border Codes).
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In a case known as Melki, 56 the ECJ ruled on a challenge to recently adopted
French national legislation.57 The legislation allowed authorities to check the
identity of any person within French national territory, or within an area of 20
kilometers of any surrounding Schengen member state.58  The ECJ found that
these police checks were functionally border controls in disguise, a violation of
the Border Codes.59 By granting French police the power to check a person's
identity, solely because that person is within 20 kilometers of a border, France
essentially authorized a border control.60 Because the French legislation did not
provide a framework for the power guaranteeing that it would not have an effect
"equivalent to border checks," the legislation was found impermissible under the
Codes. 6 1
B. France's Decision to Implement Border Checks in April 2011
Despite the ECJ ruling in Melki, France implemented the latest round of bor-
der checks in early spring 2011 to counter Italy's issuance of residential permits
to Tunisian migrants. 62 The permits, which served as a means to allow travel
among the EU countries, enabled them to settle not only in Italy, but elsewhere in
the EU as well. 63 Under current EU law, Article 5 of the Schengen Border Codes
expressly allows a member state to issue a permit to any third-country national
that is holding valid travel documents, which will then allow that person to freely
move across EU member state lines.64
56 Joined Cases, Melki & Abdeli, supra note 54; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 12 (highlighting the
previous actions of France in attempting to control and check at its borders and showing that Melki
merely demonstrated one of likely many instances where actions by the French were more than a "spo-
radic police checks").
57 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that the French national legislation allowed police authori-
ties to check identity of persons within.20 km of a Schengen member state border).
58 Id.
59 Id.; Joined Cases, Melki & Abdeli, supra note 54.
60 Joined Cases, Melki & Abdeli, supra note 54; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 12 (finding that rather
than being a type of "spot check" as permitted under Article 21 of the Border Codes, the actions, accord-
ing to the ECJ, constituted border checks in violation of Article 23).
61 Joined Cases, Melki & Abdeli, supra note 54.
62 Traynor and Hooper, supra note 1; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 12 (insisting that the actions by
France in April 2011 similarly mimic the actions taken in the Melki case where the ECJ found an imper-
missible border controls being used by the French police).
63 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 5 (permitting the issuance of temporary residence
permits to third-country nationals so long as they had the proper paperwork and so long as "they are not
considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of
any of the Member States").
6 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 5. The conditions listed under Article 5 for third-
country nationals are as follows:
1. For stays not exceeding three months per six-month period, the entry conditions for third-
country nationals shall be the following:
(a) they are in possession of a valid travel document or documents authorising them to cross
the border;
(b) they are in possession of a valid visa, if required pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No
539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession
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Though the legality of the decision by Italy was not questioned by EU offi-
cials, 6 5 France's Minister of Interior Claude Gu6ant wrote a "circular" on April 6,
2011 to challenge the permits.66 The publication argued that the Schengen rules
must be strictly interpreted, limiting the number of resident permits to be issued,
and the settlement of the Tunisian migrants should have been blocked by other
European countries, despite their possession of temporary permits. 6 7 France also
gave instructions to its police that checks of immigrants crossing the border were
permitted, and in order to be admitted immigrants must hold valid documents and
prove sufficient financial resources.68
Two weeks later, France blocked the train from Italy carrying the Tunisian
migrants, which also included activists supporting the free movement of these
of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that
requirement [17], except where they hold a valid residence permit;
(c) they justify the purpose and conditions of the intended stay, and they have sufficient
means of subsistence, both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their
country of origin or transit to a third country into which they are certain to be admitted, or are
in a position to acquire such means lawfully;
(d) they are not persons for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS for the purposes of
refusing entry;
(e) they are not considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or
the international relations of any of the Member States, in particular where no alert has been
issued in Member States' national data bases for the purposes of refusing entry on the same
grounds.
Id.; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 9 (explaining that despite the allowance by the Codes for member states
to issue permits for humanitarian reasons under Article 5, the Commission still questioned the granting of
an automatic right of free movement within the Schengen area that these permits deemed to give the
North African migrants).
65 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 8 (concluding the actions by Italy may not have been legal under the
Codes, despite Italy's insistence that it had followed the requirements). Italy was required to notify the
Commission in advance about the issuance of the permits and the decree permitting the travel within
Schengen. Id. at 9. Italy may have complied with this obligation, and it still retains its own power to
issue permits as it sees fit, but those actions must also comply with a recent Council decision regarding
asylum and immigration, Decision 2006/688/EC. Id.; see, e.g., Council Regulation, 1030/1002, 2002
O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC) (establishing format for permits issued to third-country nationals, stipulating what
must be contained in those permits).
66 Carrera, supra note 4, at 6; see Ministbre de l'intdrieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivit6s territori-
ales et de l'immigration, Autorisations de sdjour dilivries a ressortissants de pays tiers par les Etats
membres de Schengen [Temporary residence permits to third-country nationals by the Schengen member
states], Apr. 6, 2011 (ordering a stricter interpretation of the rules that govern the way third-party nation-
als are treated in the context of immigration and arguing that the proper documents are necessary),
available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/assets/pdf/ll 0407-circulaire-gueant.pdf. Ministbre de l'int6rieur, de
l'outre-mer, des collectivit6s territoriales et de l'immigration, Autorisations de sdjour ddlivrdes a ressor-
tissants de pays tiers par les Etats membres de Schengen [Temporary residence permits to third-country
nationals by the Schengen member states], Apr. 6, 2011, available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/assets/pdf/
110407-circulaire-gueant.pdf (ordering a stricter interpretation of the rules that govern the way third-
party nationals are treated in the context of immigration and arguing that the proper documents are
necessary).
67 Sophie Pilgrim, Rome Talks Tackle Concern over Open-Border Policy, FRANCE24, (Apr. 28,
2011), http://www.france24.comlen/20110425-schengen-under-threat-no-just-sarkozy-berlusconi-mi-
grant-spat-italy-france; Carrera, supra note 4, at 5.
68 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 6 (requiring the documentation and prove proof of financial resources
by France is part of Article 5 of the Border Codes, and not an individual requirement by France alone, but
one which is independently listed under the Codes).
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immigrants. 69 Invoking its powers and rights under the Border Codes, 70 France
justified its actions and defined planned demonstrations as "risques de trouble
manifeste A l'ordre," translated as a "threat to national security".71 The French
government framed the decision as a matter of public policy and couched its
reasoning in the context of the Codes. 72 In addition to its already existing rights
under the Codes, France also called for further amendments that would allow a
temporary suspension of the agreement entirely, giving it - and any country fac-
ing a similar situation - more independent power over border control.73
C. The EU Council-EU Summit on June 23-24, 2011 to Discuss France's
Actions
As a result of France's decisions, many other member states began to question
the security exceptions to the Schengen Agreement. 74 Italy, for its part, ques-
tioned whether France had the right to perform the checks and closure, sug-
gesting that it had violated the Schengen Agreement, as it had previously in
Melki.75 Although this was not the first time a country had re-introduced internal
border checks, France's actions represented one of the first times a country did so
to prevent a specific group of people from entering its borders by defining their
entrance as a national "threat to security." 76
The European Union Council met after the April 2011 events to discuss the
closure and to make recommendations for further changes to the Schengen
Agreement and the Border Codes that would make them more cohesive and ef-
fective.77 At its first meeting in early June 2011, the EU Council emphasized the
69 Traynor & Hooper supra note 1; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing whether France's
actions were appropriate within the context of "serious threat" and whether that situation required the
immediate action that was taken by the French government in blocking the train coming from
Ventimiglia).
70 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23.
71 Traynor & Hooper, supra note 1; Carrera, supra note 4, at 15 (citing a quote by French Minister of
the Interior, Claude Geuant that the possible demonstration could create civil unrest and arguing that this
interpretation of unrest was widely interpreted by the French and was likely not a threat to "public
policy" as the French government and Interior Minister tried to argue).
72 Carrera, supra note 4, at 15.
73 See BBC NEWS, supra note 5 (outlining the French government's belief that not only was the
governance of Schengen failing, but also citing an official that there was a "need to reflect on a mecha-
nism that will allow a temporary suspension of the agreement, in case of a systemic failure of an external
(EU) border").
74 See Traynor, supra note 39 (discussing the different opinions EU member states have regarding
the Schengen Agreement and the exceptions allowed under the Border Codes, particularly by France,
Germany and Italy, who were not in support with the Commission's recommendations distinguishing
between foreseeable and unforeseeable events in allowing a member state to act independently).
75 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 12 (showing the past attempts by France in order to enable border
checks by their own police forces near the borders, that the ECJ found was actually an attempt at border
controls and was not permissible under the Border Codes, Article 21).
76 Id. at 14.
77 Press Release, European Council, European Council 23/24 (June 24, 2011), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/l l/4&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN
&gui Language=en [hereinafter EC Press Release June 2011]; see Proposal amending Regulation (EC)
No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the
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importance of enforcing common rules and stressed the need for an effective and
reliable monitoring and evaluation system.78
In order to be effective, the proposed evaluation system would have to be EU-
based and would involve experts from the member states, the Commission, and
competent agencies. 79 In addition to these experts, the Council invited the Com-
mission to report regularly on the results of evaluations and, where necessary, to
propose measures to respond to any deficiencies it identifies.80 The Council also
decided that a mechanism should be introduced in order to respond to exceptional
circumstances that could put the overall functioning of Schengen cooperation at
risk.8 This mechanism would be comprised of a series of measures to be applied
in a gradual, differentiated, and coordinated manner to assist a member state fac-
ing heavy pressure at the external borders. 8 2 Finally, the Council recognized that
a safeguard clause could be introduced as a last resort to allow the exceptional
reintroduction of internal border controls in truly critical situations, namely those
in which a member state is no longer able to comply with its obligations under
the Schengen rules.83 Ultimately, after these recommendations, the Council con-
ceded that responsibility for the control and surveillance of the external borders
lies with the individual member states acting in the common interest of all mem-
ber states and therefore recognized the importance of applying the same stan-
dards evenly.8 4
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and the Convention
implementing the Schengen Agreement, arts. 21-22, COM(2011) 118 final, Brussels, 10 March 2011,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/newslintro/docs/SBC%20amendment%20EN.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Proposal Amending Schengen Borders Code] (proposing a repeal of Article 22 of the Border Codes,
making a reference to it in Article 21(d) instead, but not affecting the right of states to provide checks to
fight illegal immigration set out in (a) to (c)).
78 See EC Press Release June 2011, supra note 77 (discussing the importance of creating an EU-
based evaluation system in order to improve the overall system and create more uniform policies in the
area of border control and security); see also Carrera, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining the meeting of the
Council to discuss the actions by France in April 2011).
79 EC Press Release June 2011, supra note 77.
80 Id.; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining the desire of the Council to have input made by the
Commission regarding the actions by France in closing its border and instituting its checks).
81 See EC Press Release June 2011, supra note 77 (explaining the mechanism recommended by the
Commission to aid a member state struggling with control or pressure from their external border, and to
not leave that member state to deal with the problem on their own).
82 See id. (finding these measures could include inspection visits and technical and financial support,
as well as assistance, coordination and intervention from Frontex).
83 See id. (discussing the need still for some sort of last resort in order to please all groups of member
states). The safeguard clause would be for "a strictly limited scope and period of time" and would enable
member states that needed to react in "urgent cases" to do so without affecting the rights of persons under
the Agreement and TFEU. Id.
84 Id.; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 5-7 (discussing the actions by France in dealing with the migrants
coming from Italy further created a divide amongst EU countries who either favor stricter Schengen rules
and more approval by the Commission, or for countries that deal with a greater influx of immigrants and
migrants regularly, such as Germany or Austria). After the actions by France, other states like Austria,
Germany and Belgium threatened a re-introduction of border checks, highlighting the problems with
Schengen and its consistency among member states and calling to question whether a violation of the
"spirit" of the Agreement could and would be tolerated. Id. at 6.
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IV. Analysis
A. The Influx of Tunisian Migrants Was Not an "Exceptional" Circumstance
Because France temporarily closed its border with Italy for a reason not con-
templated by the Border Codes, it was not a legal action under the Schengen
Agreement.85 Despite France's justifications for instituting the checks and clo-
sures, its overall actions were not permissible under the Codes because the North
African migrants were not a threat to national security.8 6 Under the Border
Codes, the actions taken constituted more than sporadic police controls within the
French territory or "spot-checks" at the border with Italy, either of which could
have been permissible under Article 21 of the Codes.87 Rather, they constituted a
systematic reintroduction of internal border checks with Italy,88 the main objec-
tive of which was to erect a barrier that would keep out Tunisian immigrants
holding an Italian temporary-residence permit. 89 The Schengen regime operates
through an understanding of cooperation and closeness that requires all member
states to follow the codes, thus guaranteeing that the functions of the regime will
be met and the regime itself will maintain its legitimacy.90 However, in relation
to immigration, the lack of cooperation - and the readiness to abandon the Codes
- when it comes to third-country nationals highlight the existing problems under
Schengen. 9'
85 Id.; see Press Release, Statement by Commissioner Malmstrdm, European Commission Midday
Press Briefing of (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/player/streaming.cfm?type=
ebsvod&sid= 177156 (releasing the official view of the EU Commission regarding the group of migrants
from North Africa and the actions by both France and Italy).
86 See infra Part IV.A-B (arguing that the group of migrants coming from Italy could not have consti-
tuted a threat, per Article 23, and France's justifications were likely based on its desire to limit
immigration).
87 See Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 21 (allowing border checks only so long "as the
exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks"); see also Carrera, supra
note 4, at 12-14 (arguing the border closures and checks performed by France were more than the "spo-
radic" checks, but were actually more similar to the actions in Melki).
88 See Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23 (outlining what constitutes the re-introduction
of internal border checks under the Codes and what is permissible for a member state); see also Carrera,
supra note 4, at 14 (finding that Italy's actions constituted border controls and the Tunisian migrants did
not represent a threat to security, as required by Article 23 of the Codes, and therefore the re-introduction
was not permissible).
89 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 11 (describing the conditions under which France pushed back
against the entrance of the immigrants, occurring not long after France publicly announced a policy to
expel immigrants from its territory).
90 See e.g., Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 16 (describing the requirements of "Coopera-
tion between Member States" as a requirement to "assist each other" and cooperate and maintain effec-
tive border control implementation of Articles 6-15 through the exchange of information).
91 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 12-14 (discussing the other member states issues with the current
Schengen system only allowing border checks and controls in a situation of threat to security or public
policy); see also Traynor, supra note 39 (outlining the differing views between the EU in dealing with
third-country nationals, a more strict option for border control for member states favored by the Commis-
sion, with a more independent option for border power for member states by countries like France).
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When evaluated alongside previous border controls by EU member states in
times of crisis, 9 2 it is evident that France's handling of the influx of Tunisians is
of a different character.93 In the past, while some political demonstrations, ter-
rorist threats, and ceremonies of national importance have all been cited as
grounds for re-imposing border controls, 94 only a small number of cases since the
1990s have been linked to the desire to restrict immigration of a specific group.95
For the most part, member states have abided by the Border Codes, and in partic-
ular Article 23, which only allows border controls when national officials believe
a serious threat to security or public policy arises. 96 The Codes have typically
restricted a member of the Schengen Agreement from preventing certain groups
deemed undesirable from entering its borders, and have allowed such actions
only in very limited circumstances. 97
Despite France's concerns about the possibility of a demonstration disrupting
the social order, the small number of migrants attempting to enter France in April
2011 shows that this fear was unsubstantiated.98 First, there was no evidence that
the planned demonstration would have been anything but peaceful. 99 Second, the
small number of people involved in the demonstration - approximately sixty mi-
grants on the train, joined by a group of about three hundred protestors from Italy
92 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 23 (listing in Table Al the re-introduction of internal border controls
since 1995 by EU member states, noting that the list itself is not an exhaustive list but demonstrates the
member states who have invoked these types of controls).
93 See id. at 13 (citing previous examples of Germany and 2006 football World Cup, various interna-
tional political meetings, including Italy's reinstatement of border checks during the 2009 G8 summit in
L'Aquila).
94 See id. at 23 (citing examples of reasons for reintroducing border controls); see e.g., K.
Groenendijk, Reinstatement of Conirols at the Internal Borders of Europe: Why and Against Whom?, 10
EUR. L. J. 150, 158 (Mar. 2004) (discussing the reasons for re-introductions of internal border controls by
EU member states).
95 Carrera, supra note 4, at 23. The appendix of this article discusses the previous recorded re-
introductions of border controls. Id. Since 1995, few border control actions have involved the restriction
of a specific immigrant group. Id. For example, in March 1999 France re-introduced border control to
block a demonstration in support of undocumented immigrants in Paris to prevent the crossing of Albani-
ans and Italians to participate in the demonstration. Id. Additionally, Belgium from December 2000 to
January 2001 resurrected border controls due to "risk of a sudden, temporary increase in asylum seekers."
Id. at 24; see e.g., Groenendijk, supra note 94, at 158 (citing the re-introduction of border checks by
France in March 1999).
96 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23.
97 Id. (limiting the action by member states by stating that the "scope and duration of the temporary
reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond
to the serious threat").
99 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 14 (citing the total number of immigrants from North Africa subject
to French border controls as only a few hundred, and "no more than" four hundred); see also Migrant
Train Delay Causes European Diplomatic Rift, CNN (Apr. 18, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-181
worldlitaly.france.tunisia.migrants_ I -migrants-tunisians-lampedusa?_s=PM:WORLD (discussing the
small amount of immigrants actually attempting to enter France by train, around sixty, and the total
number actually possibly entering from the crisis itself, around only three hundred).
99 CNN, supra note 98; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 15 (arguing that the small number of migrants
and actual estimated demonstrators could not constitute a security threat within the meaning of Article
23).
340 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9, Issue 2
Suspending Schengen
and France - further supported the notion that the situation could not be labeled
as an emergency or a threat to national security.'"
Between January and April 2011, Italy had already issued thousands of tempo-
rary visas, and an estimated twenty-five thousand people had crossed its bor-
ders.' 0 Compared to the average number of permits issued across the EU every
year, these figures are relatively low.10 2 For example, in 2009, the EU issued just
over two million residence permits to non-EU citizens, or fewer than two hun-
dred thousand per month.' 03 Therefore, comparing the total entering the EU with
those entering Italy individually, along with the three hundred or so migrants
from April, the "emergency" situation appears to be somewhat exaggerated.'o4
Rather than responding to an imminent threat, France was performing border
controls disguised as routine checks, in direct violation of the letter of the Border
Codes and the spirit of the Schengen Agreement. 05
Issuing its opinion on the matter, the EU and its Commissioner for Home
Affairs Cecilia Malstrom concluded that the influx did not constitute an emer-
gency within the meaning of Article 23.106 Both the Commission and Malstrom
l00 See CNN, supra note 98 (estimating around sixty migrants from Tunisia were on the train that was
blockaded from entering France, while around three hundred Italians and French formed a group known
as "Train for dignity" to support those migrants attempting to enter France at that time).
101 France seeks change to Schengen border agreement, BBC NEWS, Apr. 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-europe-13171403; see Carerra, supra note 389, at 6 (discussing the implications of justi-
fying the border controls in terms of national security, when in actuality the conflict and reasons behind it
is more political); see Medhi Chebil, Migrant Spat Puts Strain on EU Open Borders, FRANCE24 (Apr. 19,
2011), http://www.france24.comlen/20110419-tunisia-migrant-train-blockade-comes-under-legal-attack-
ventimiglia-french-police-italy. (explaining that some legal experts believe the targeting specifically of
these North African migrants was illegal, and could spark a discrimination lawsuit, further jeopardizing
France's ability and policy of restricting these movements across borders). Brigitte Espuche, a legal
expert from the French rights group Anaf6, told France24.com that "[p]olice forces are aware that it
[continued targeting of North Africans] would be completely illegal. When reports emerged on February
21 that an internal note calling for the control of Tunisian nationals was put up in the Cannes police
station, it was pulled down the next day." Id.
102 See Lucilla Scarnicchia, Residence Permits Issued to Non-Eu Citizens in 2009, Eurostat 43/2011,
EUROPEAN COMM'N. (Sept. 1, 2011), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITYOFFPUB/KS-SF-11-
043/EN/KS-SF-l l-043-EN.PDF [hereinafter Residence Permits, Eurostat] (citing statistics from 2009,
the issuance of over two million new residence permits across the EU to third-country nationals, describ-
ing these statistics involved fewer employment permits and for family reasons, while increasing for the
purposes of education); see also Carrera, supra note 4, at 14 (stating these statistics highlight that a real
"emergency" cannot be constituted by a small group of an estimated three hundred people).
103 Scarnicchia, supra note 102 (explaining that the main three reasons for permits issued by member
states are family, education and employment, and in 2009 France predominantly issued family permits,
while Italy predominantly issued permits for employment).
104 See id. (explaining the reasons for issuing residence permits in 2009, including family re-unifica-
tion, employment, and education). According to the statistics, France issued 193,500 total residence
permits in 2009, while Italy issued 506,833 permits. Id. The large majority of Italian permits issued
were marked as "employment permits", constituting 46.6% of its total permits issued. Id. In terms of
population, however, Cyprus issued the highest number of permits at year, followed by UK and Sweden.
Id.
105 See Carrera, supra note 4, at I1-12 (giving the background of border control by the French govern-
ment in relation to migrants and the declarations made by them that they would refuse to accept undocu-
mented immigrants from North Africa).
106 See Press Release by Malmstrom, supra note 85 (stating, as the Commissioner for Home Affairs,
the official view of the EU institutions regarding the actions of border closures and checks by France, and
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reinforced the idea that Schengen means "no borders,"107 and allowing border
checks by a member state is only a last resort effort to protect a state under
"serious threat," something the Tunisian migrants did not present. 0 8 Ultimately,
the Commission decided that in order to prevent further similar actions by other
member states seeking to bar a certain group from entering its borders, changes
to the Schengen Agreement were not only desirable, but a necessary step for the
future cohesion of the EU. 09
B. France's Political Issues with Immigration Influenced the Closing of Its
Borders
Rather than posing a security threat to France, the group of migrants from
Tunisia represented a threat of a different kind - and one that France has been
struggling to cope with since the beginning of Schengen. t0 In fact, not long
before the incident in April, the French government announced a policy that
would expel thousands of "irregular" immigrants from the country."' This an-
nouncement came after a long and continuous struggle France has faced in deal-
ing with illegal immigration.1 2 The policy began by addressing around twenty-
five thousand "irregular" immigrants and removed them from France during the
first three months of 2011, just before the border closures and checks in April.' 3
Along with the adoption of that policy, France has made an effort over the past
decade to concentrate on protecting its borders by encouraging a new system of
issuing visas and by increasing cooperation with transportation authorities, differ-
finding that the group of migrants did not constitute an "emergency" within the meaning of Article 23
and therefore the temporary internal border controls by France were not permissible under Schengen).
107 Id.; TFEU, supra note 5, art. 77.
108 Press Release by Malmstrim, supra note 85; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 15 (agreeing that, while
France holds some discretion in determining what constitutes "public policy" and threats to security, the
small group of demonstrators and immigrants, totaling around three hundred people, proportionally were
not nearly comparable to other scenarios where border checks and controls constituted a serious threat).
Additionally adding that, by signing on to the Treaty of Lisbon, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
was expanded to rule of public policy "measures/exceptions" concerning checks at the internal borders
and under the Codes. Id.
109 Press Release by Malmstrom, supra note 85; see EU clears France, Italy over Schengen row,
EURAciv (July 26, 2011), http://www.euractiv.com/justice/eu-clears-france-italy-schengen-row-news-
506763 (discussing the Commission's ultimate conclusion that France and Italy did not violate Schengen
per se, but rather violated the "spirit" of the Agreement in their dealing with the Tunisian migrants).
110 See Schain, supra note 34, at 9-10 (explaining the political context regarding the French govern-
ment's desire to control immigration, particularly after Schengen, and the diminishing foreign population
since 1982, particularly the North African population).
111 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 11-12 (discussing the policy released in 2011 announcing the removal
of undocumented immigrants from the French territory in 2011, including removals from January to
April), see also Schain, supra note 34, at 17-18 (explaining that France, even before the agreement to
abolish border controls within Schengen, had intended to strengthen its controls at "external" borders and
the struggle over what rights immigrants an asylum-seekers do have is ongoing).
112 See Schain, supra note 34, at 9-10 (explaining that immigration has always been an important
issue in France, particularly after the opening of internal borders after the Schengen agreement).
I13 Carrera, supra note 89, at I1.
342 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9, Issue 2
Suspending Schengen
ent police organizations, and others.' 14 Additionally, its continued efforts to co-
operate with and participate in FRONTEX operations, like "joint return" of
illegal immigrants, demonstrate France's overall desire to limit and exclude mi-
grants.1is Taken as a whole, these actions demonstrate France's struggle with
immigration and its desire to control its own borders, despite the mandates of the
Schengen Agreement."' 6
V. Proposal
By allowing the temporary suspension of the Schengen Agreement, the goal of
a cohesive EU is threatened, and its image in the international community will
continue to be questioned.' 7  The proposals for amendments of the Schengen
Agreement presented by groups of member states and the Commission itself
demonstrates the divide present among EU members as to whether the Agree-
ment can continue to exist in its current form." 8 This divide is particularly evi-
dent in light of countries like France, which favor stricter immigration and border
policies and more independent member state control, and which have taken indi-
vidual action to ensure they retain some power in relation to their borders.' 19
As a result of this divisiveness - and a desire for complete exclusion by some
states - some European institutions have begun to provide arenas for the devel-
opment of exclusionary policies,12 0 and have allowed these types of border shut-
114 Schain, supra note 34, at 9; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 23 (discussing the increased efforts at
border protection was particularly seen at airports, as a way to begin strengthening its "external" cross-
ings and dealing with the new visa system).
115 See Schain, supra note 34, at 23 (describing the evolving institutions dealing with immigration
control are designed to exclude and limit migrants, despite the actual lack of problem of illegal immigra-
tion in France, and the policies are focused on linking the idea of illegal entry, and identity and security).
116 See Schain, supra note 34, at 17 (explaining France's concern with illegal immigration and the role
Frontex has played in helping France organize operations to return undocumented immigrants, also aid-
ing and pressuring EU countries on the borders to block entry of migrants who might otherwise find their
way to France).
117 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 12.
118 See Traynor & Hooper, supra note 1 (stating that the Commission, recognizing the divide amongst
EU countries regarding the issue of immigration and the "borderless" zone of travel that Schengen pro-
vides, was drawing up proposals to alter the system); see also Carrera, supra note 4, at 19 (discussing that
the differences in opinions regarding immigration is a "race to the bottom" in regards to Italy and France,
and the consistency and legitimacy of the migration policy across Europe is at stake now); see e.g.,
TFEU, supra note 5, art. 80 (stipulating implementation of the policies of the EU "shall be governed by
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility").
119 Schain, supra note 34, at 24. Other countries like the UK, Germany, and Netherlands have also
started to deepen their own concerns with national identity and have developed "debates" that clearly
place immigrants outside their own national community. Id.; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 12-14 (discuss-
ing Melki and other attempts by France to institute border checks and controls independently from EU
policies on immigration).
120 See Schain, supra note 34, at 21 (discussing the participation of France with FRONTEX opera-
tions, explaining the increasingly difficult requirements for visa applications to enter France, and the
creation of a special police unit under the Ministry of the Interior). The Central Directorate of the
Frontier Police (DCPAF) is a special police unit created in 1999 to "control the frontier", and since 2005
has been in cooperation with FRONTEX. Id. at 21-22. FRONTEX's operations within Europe have also
expanded, with a budget expansion of over eighty-two million Euros from 2005 to 2009. Id. at 22.
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downs by EU countries.121 The organization permitting the largest number of
"exclusion" policies is FRONTEX, an institution that, since 2005, has become
important in dealing with immigration issues.12 2 Exclusion has largely been seen
through joint efforts, often with the support of France, to engage in enforcement
of border controls and "joint return" operations to deal with undocumented immi-
grants.123 France continues to enforce its position against illegal immigration,
boasting a record number of illegal immigrants expelled in 2011, nearing almost
forty thousand.12 4  Therefore, if these types of developments continue and
FRONTEX continues to expand with the support and engagement of countries
like France, the exclusionary image of Europe among the international commu-
nity will only increase.125
In order to prevent greater fracturing and even more border suspensions, the
EU must take action.12 6 In truth, with its focus on common policies and princi-
ples, the foundation of the EU is based on the notion of "solidarity," and in the
end all member states must be willing to cede some degree of autonomy for the
Union as a whole to function.127 One possible solution is for the EU to limit the
scope of the phrase "serious threat to public policy or internal security" as cur-
rently listed in Article 23 of the Schengen Border Codes.128 The general lan-
121 Schain, supra note 34, at 22.
122 See e.g., What is Frontex?, supra note 31 (giving information regarding FRONTEX, its operations
and its functions within the EU as whole).
123 See Schain, supra note 34, at 22 (discussing that some of these "joint return" missions, aimed at
returning undocumented immigrants, were largely participated in by France, who took part in sixteen of
the total thirty-two operations performed); see also Sylvie Corbet, France Expels Record Number of
Illegal Immigrants, ABC NE.ws (Jan 10, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory/frances-
expulsions-immigrants-rise-2011-15328523 (discussing the statistics recently cited by France and Presi-
dent Sarkozy, as an attempt to target anti-immigrant voters by citing the record for number of immigrants
expelled, "32,912 illegal immigrants in 2011, up 17.5 percent from 2010").
124 See Corbet, supra note 123 (citing France's desire to increase the number of expelled to thirty-five
thousand for 2012).
125 Schain, supra note 34, at 22; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (explaining that by viewing immigra-
tion as a burden, as France seems to do, the idea of solidarity slips further away and the need for a
common immigration policy becomes more evident).
126 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that if the EU fails to act strongly and "on time" the rules
and principles of the EU and the Schengen Agreement will only continue to be undermined and could
ultimately create tension between EU and non-EU countries, particularly with those countries whose
nationals are subject to the policies of immigration that are seen as repressive).
127 See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 80 (outlining the principle of solidarity in relation to the policies of
the Union, particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon). Article 80 states that implementation of
policies:
shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its
financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted
pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.
Id.; see also Groenendijk, supra note 94, at 158 (arguing that an integral part of European integration was
the Schengen Agreement and any attempts to empower member states to alter the rules of the Agreement
would undermine this integration that is one of the "great success stories of the EU").
128 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (suggesting the
revision of the Border Codes in way that does not follow the "nationalistic and opportunistic goals" of
France and Italy, but by attempting to reinforce Schengen by defining "security" more thoroughly); see,
e.g., Sarkozy, Berlusconi to propose Schengen "upgrade", EURAcriv, Apr. 26, 2011, http://www.eur
activ.com/en/future-eu/sarkozy-berlusconi-propose-schengen-upgrade-news-504292 (discussing the
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guage of Article 23 allows border controls "[w]here there is a serious threat to
public policy or internal security."' 29 By outlining specific instances where a
member state can institute internal border checks, rather than generally stating
the possibility of a threat, individual power by member states can be simultane-
ously enhanced and limited in a way to create a more cohesive and uniform
policy. 130
Additionally, the EU could create an option in the Codes for a member state to
request a border check patrolled by the EU, rather than by its own national po-
lice. 131 This border check, already permissible under Article 21,132 would pro-
vide more control to EU institutions.13 3 Particularly, the Commission would be
able to better determine how to deal with a possible threat to security like that
claimed by France, one that is not actually a threat within the meaning of Article
23.134
However, either option leave countries like France and Italy, which seek
amendments to Schengen that would allow more member state discretion, with-
out any real options for their own border control. 3 The freedom of movement
and need for labor migration ultimately cannot be seen as a "burden to share,"' 36
but rather as an opportunity to choose between interests - autonomy of each
member state or the survival of Europe as a whole - and member states must
goals of France and Italy to change Schengen, even going so far as to propose a clause that allows the
temporary suspension of Schengen as a whole in a limited number of circumstances).
129 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23.
130 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 21 (concluding that any attempts to widen a member state's power
under Schengen would undermine the law principles of the EU, but also the EU treaties in general, and
would create problems for EU integration); see also Groenendijk, supra note 94, at 158 (citing common
policy and solidarity as essential aspects for the functioning of the EU).
131 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (suggesting the creation of an appropriate monitoring system to
ensure implementation of EU border laws across Schengen's external borders).
132 See Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 21 (defining the "checks within the territory"
permissible under the Border Codes).
133 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 21; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (highlighting the
importance of action by the EU institutions, particularly the Commission, in controlling and operating in
the area of immigration policy in order to ensure proper implementation exists across all EU member
states, and that fundamental human rights are a central priority in this area of policy).
134 Schengen Border Codes, supra note 35, art. 23; see Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing the
importance of and strategy against "populist and nationalist anti-immigration rhetoric" that many mem-
ber states have demonstrated and re-defining what is and can be considered a "security threat"). Addi-
tionally, immigration should not be seen a threat to security, but rather the freedom of movement should
be seen as a chance to enhance a common policy, thereby enhancing the EU market and its competitive-
ness. Id.
135 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 21 (explaining that what is more important is for control to remain in
the hands of the EU institutions in dealing with the creation and maintenance of common EU immigra-
tion policy); see also Traynor & Hooper, supra note 1 (highlighting the proposed amendments by France
and Italy, demonstrating their desire for more control over policies under the Schengen Agreement).
136 Carrera, supra note 4, at 20; see Schain, supra note 34, at 8 (discussing the viewpoint of those who
view immigration as "burden", or a "menace" that Europe is unable to deal with through its Schengen
Agreement). A number of publications, for example that of Christopher Caldwell, address the vision that
Europe has no way to "combat this rising 'menace'" that is immigration. Id.; see generally, CHRISTO-
PHER CALDWEIii.,, REFLECTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION IN EuRoPE: IMMIGRATION, ISLAM AND THE WEST
(Doubleday 2009) (arguing that Europe has no political will to find the means to combat the "menace"
that is illegal immigration and it doesn't have the ability to control "its frontiers").
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decide whether it is worth giving up enough autonomy in order to have one
overall border.137
VI. Conclusion
France's temporary border checks and controls in April 2011 were illegal
under the Border Codes and called into question the future of the Schengen
Agreement in dealing with migration issues. Essentially, the situation between
France and Italy highlighted the problems faced by the European Union stem-
ming from a lack of common policy for internal and external border control as
required under the Schengen Agreement. Particularly, the EU has no obvious
means to deal with member states' actions in deciding whether an influx of mi-
grants constitutes a threat to security or public policy under Article 23. This lack
of specificity under the Codes has created a divide among member countries as to
whether amendments to Schengen are needed and whether control should be fo-
cused in the hands of the institutions themselves or the member states.
For now, the EU must decide which direction it would like to take in dealing
with Schengen and border control. If countries like France continue to desire
individual power and control over their borders and continue to institute border
checks and controls in non-emergency situations, the future of Schengen will be
unclear and will continue to threaten the cohesiveness of the European Union.
346 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review
137 See Carrera, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that rather than being a problem, the development of EU
immigration policy "would be coherent with Europe's labour market needs and competitiveness" and
would ensure openness, flexibility, and compatibility with the other various EU policies).
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